Seminar on Behavioral and Experimental Economics (Session 7)
[Time] October 10, 2019 (Thursday) 12:00-13:30
[Location] Conference Room 729 of Minde Main Building
[Theme] Unequal Past, United Future–Reaching a Climate Agreement given Past Responsibilities
[President] Liu Ning, Assistant Professor, School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
[Moderator] Sun Wenkai, Professor, School of Economics, Chinese Min University
[Reviewer] Wang Xianghong, Professor, School of Economics, Chinese Min University
[Abstract] Through a laboratory experiment, we measure the self-serving bias in collective-risk social dilemma. We explore beliefs over the “fair allocation” of contributions among asymmetric players, and measure self-serving bias using the difference in contributions in the veil of ignorance setting and in the multiplayer dictator game. We study how those are affected by alternative narratives of historical responsibilities. We find that subjects have broadly shared belief on the fair allocation of contributions, where poor and rich alike, contribute the same proportion of their endowment behind the veil of ignorance. However, their contributions differ in the multi-player dictator game. Overall, rich succumb more to the self-serving bias than the poor. The three framings of historical responsibility have different impact. Under the framing of inherited responsibility, self-serving bias of the rich is eliminated, while that of the poor is amplified leading to a more equal society in terms of wealth.
[ Introduction] Liu Ning, Assistant Professor, School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He graduated from Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and later conducted postdoctoral research at Bocconi University in Milan, Italy. The main areas of research are individual and group decision-making, focusing on risk and uncertainty and the concept of equity. Recent research has focused on improving climate change and promoting sustainable development, combining decision-making theory and practice. The findings have been published in the journal Nature Climate Change, Journal of Risk and Nespresso, Theory and Decision.
Seminar on Behavioral and Experimental Economics (Session 4)
[Time] June 12, 2019 (Wednesday) 12:00-13:30
[Location] Room 729, Mingde Main Building
[topic] Goalsetting, effort provision and performance: A field experiment
[Leader] Weng Yi (Assistant Professor, School of Labor and Human Resources, Renmin University of China)
[Moderator] Sun Wenkai (Professor, School of Economics, Renmin University of China)
[Reviewer] Wang Xianghong (Professor, School of Economics, Renmin University of China)
[Learning summary] Goal setting may be a low-cost, scalable and logistically simple commitment device to help people self-regulate their behavior, and increase their effort and pyramid improve their performance. By conducting a field experiment in college physical training course, we Investing the effects of goal setting and goal design features on effort provision in training and tests and on their performance. We exogenously vary whether or not a goal is set and whether or not the goal is set based on accurately knowing one’s ability. When students know their precise ability, goal setting significant raises test performance. Goal setting also significant raises test effort, especially when students do not know their precise ability.
[Introduction to the keynote speaker] Weng Yi, assistant professor at the School of Labor and Human Resources, Renmin University of China. He graduated from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden in 2014 with a Ph.D. in economics. His research interests are labor economics, behavioral and experimental economics. He has published many papers in international academic journals such as Journal of Public Economics, China Economic Review, Journal of Forest Economics, and Singapore Economic Review. He has presided over projects such as the National Natural Science Foundation of China and the Research Fund of the People’s University of China.
Behavioral and Experimental Economics Seminar (Session 5)
[Time] March 14, 2019 (Thursday) 12:00-13:30
[Location] 734 Conference room, Mingde main building
[Theme] The Cooperative consequences of contests
[President] Anta (Associate professor, Department of Economics, Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management)
[Moderator] Wang Xianghong (professor, School of Economics, Renmin University of the People)
[Reviewer] Sun Wenkei (proessor, School of Economics, Renmin University of the People) ”
[Abstract] Although contests is theoretically recognized as a highly effective method of motivation , recent studies (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm, 2010; Buser and Dreber, 2016) suggest-competitive nature of contests may induce negative behavioral externalities in OT her domains. Using a laboratory experiment of real effort contests with treatments varying by prize structure, we test the effect of Di Fferent types of contests and their outcomes to pro-social behavior in classic games. Within-person effects of the contest on behavior in the prisoner’s Dilemma, trust game and public goods game is assessed. Across subjects, we examine the relative impacts of standard All-pay auction contests, Tullock contests with Probabilisti C Winning, proportional prizes and piece rate