行为和实验经济学研讨会 (总第7期)


【时 间】2019年10月10日(周四)12:00—13:30
【地 点】明德主楼729会议室
【主 题】Unequal Past, United Future–Reaching a Climate Agreement given Past Responsibilities

【摘 要】Through a laboratory experiment, we measure the self-serving bias in collective-risk social dilemma. We explore beliefs over the “fair allocation” of contributions among asymmetric players, and measure self-serving bias using the difference in contributions in the veil of ignorance setting and in the multiplayer dictator game. We study how those are affected by alternative narratives of historical responsibilities. We find that subjects have broadly shared belief on the fair allocation of contributions, where poor and rich alike, contribute the same proportion of their endowment behind the veil of ignorance. However, their contributions differ in the multi-player dictator game. Overall, rich succumb more to the self-serving bias than the poor. The three framings of historical responsibility have different impact. Under the framing of inherited responsibility, self-serving bias of the rich is eliminated, while that of the poor is amplified leading to a more equal society in terms of wealth.

【主讲人简介】刘宁,北京航空航天大学经济管理学院助理教授。博士毕业于荷兰鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学(Erasmus University Rotterdam),之后在意大利米兰博科尼大学(Bocconi University)进行博士后研究。主要研究领域为个人和群体决策,重点关注风险与不确定性及公平观念。近年来的研究注重结合决策理论和实践,致力于改善气候变化以及促进可持续发展。研究成果在Nature Climate Change, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Theory and Decision等国际权威期刊上发表。

[行为和实验经济学研讨会]Goalsetting, effort provision and performance: A field experiment


【时 间】2019年6月12日(周三)12:00—13:30
【地 点】明德主楼729会议室
【主 题】Goalsetting, effort provision and performance: A field experiment

【讲座摘要】Goal setting may be a low-cost, scalable and logistically simple commitment device to help people self-regulate their behavior, and increase their effort and consequently improve their performance. By conducting a field experiment in college physical training course, we investigate the effects of goal setting and goal design features on effort provision in training and tests and on their performance. We exogenously vary whether or not a goal is set and whether or not the goal is set based on accurately knowing one’s ability. We find that when students know their precise ability, goal setting significantly raises test performance. Goal setting also significantly raises test effort, especially when students do not know their precise ability.

【主讲人简介】翁茜,中国人民大学劳动人事学院助理教授。2014年毕业于瑞典哥德堡大学,获得经济学博士学位。研究领域为劳动经济学、行为与实验经济学。曾在Journal of Public Economics,China Economic Review,Journal of Forest Economics,Singapore Economic Review等国际学术期刊上发表论文多篇。主持过国家自然科学基金、中国人民大学科学研究基金等项目。

[行为和实验经济学研讨会]The Cooperative Consequences of Contests


【时 间】2019年3月14日(周四)12:00—13:30
【地 点】明德主楼734会议室
【主 题】The Cooperative Consequences of Contests

【讲座摘要】Although contests are theoretically recognized as a highly effective method of motivation when resources are limited, recent studies (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm, 2010; Buser and Dreber, 2016) suggest that the competitive nature of contests may induce negative behavioral externalities in other domains. Using a laboratory experiment of real effort contests with treatments varying by prize structure, we test the effect of different types of contests and their outcomes on pro-social behavior in classic games. Within-person effects of the contest on behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma, trust game and public goods game are assessed. Across subjects, we examine the relative impacts of standard all-pay auction contests, Tullock contests with probabilistic winning, proportional prizes and piece rate payment with social comparison. While pro-sociality generally decreases after a competition, it decreases most significantly in the proportional contest and piece rate with social comparison settings, driven mostly by greater anti-social action taken in the prisoner’s dilemma and trust games. Our study has managerial consequences for the structure incentives in the workplace when a combination of competition and cooperation is needed among workers.

【主讲人简介】郑捷,清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授,清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任,国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编辑(Associate Editor),Research in Economics副编辑(Associate Editor)。2003年获得清华大学经济学学士学位,2005年获得清华大学经济学硕士学位,2007年获得美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士学位,2011年获得华盛顿大学经济学博士学位。研究领域主要包括经济理论、信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学。先后主持多项国家自然科学基金项目,发表论文二十余篇。研究工作发表于Management Science、Nature Communications、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Experimental Economics等国际期刊,且有部分工作被收录入Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology,学术成果被中国信息经济学会授予”中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖”,2016-2018连续三年获“中国信息经济学青年创新奖”。


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[行为和实验经济学研讨会]The Psychology and Economics of a Superstition


【时 间】2018年11月5日(周一)12:00—13:30
【地 点】明德主楼734会议室
【主 题】The Psychology and Economics of a Superstition
【主讲人】Joshua Miller(Assistant Professor at the University of Alicante(Spain))
【语 言】英语
【摘 要】We design two field experiments and a laboratory experiment in order to determine if people are willing to incur a cost (qualitative and quantitative) to behave in accordance with their superstitious beliefs. We explore potential mechanisms.
【主讲人简介】Joshua Miller is an economist at the University of Alicante (Spain). He received his PhD in Economics from the University of Minnesota. He works primarily in the areas of behavioral and experimental economics. His current research interests focus on information processing, judgment under uncertainty, and belief aggregation. He has published papers in top journals such as Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, and Management Science.

[行为和实验经济学研讨会]The role of incentive in promoting cooperation


【时 间】2018年11月1日(周四)12:30—14:00
【地 点】明德主楼734会议室
【主 题】The role of incentive in promoting cooperation
【摘 要】Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas has been a longstanding and fundamental topic in both the social and biological sciences. In human society, this problem can be solved by establishing incentive mechanisms that reward cooperators and punish free-riders. In this presentation, the role of incentive in promoting cooperation is discussed from both theoretical and experimental perspectives.

【主讲人简介】张博宇,北京师范大学,数学科学学院,副教授,博士生导师。2006年在北京师范大学数学科学学院获学士学位,2009年在北京师范大学数学科学学院获硕士学位,2012年在奥地利维也纳大学数学系获博士学位,后进入北京师范大学数学科学学院工作,2015年晋升副教授。主要研究兴趣包括演化博弈和行为经济学等。在PNAS,Operations Research,Games and Economic Behaviour等国际著名学术期刊上发表论文30余篇。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目等共4项。








【时 间】2018年9月7日(周五)11:30—14:00
【地 点】明德主楼734会议室
【主 题】“行为和实验经济学的中国发展”圆桌讨论





【时 间】2018年9月11日(周二)12:00—13:30
【地 点】明德主楼734会议室
【主 题】资产配置与价格泡沫:一项实验经济学研究

【摘 要】这篇论文运用实验经济学的方法探讨了实物资产的泡沫问题。在本文的实验定中,参与者需要重复进行实物资产的购入并进行生产的决策,实验过程中实物资产的基础价值保持不变。实验设计参考了Holt et al(2017)关于风险资产价格泡沫的论文和Holt and Shobe (2016)关于碳排放权市场的论文。我们对之前论文的创新在于:(1)构造了资产供给不变或趋紧的设置;(2)构造了资产基础价值不变的设置;(3)在实验设计中构造的实物资产与金融资产有不同的属性。我们发现,实物资产的供给不变的情况下,其价格会产生泡沫,但泡沫会很快破灭;当实物资产的供给逐渐减少时,参与者无法进行理性的跨期平滑使用,资产价格呈现缓慢上涨至暴涨的现象。根据实验中收集参与者对价格的预期数据,本文发现预期与实际价格的差值驱动了资产价格的上涨和下跌。本文同时还发现,如果允许参与者跨期进行实物资产的借还,将有利于平抑资产的价格泡沫。

【主讲人简介】魏立佳(Lijia Wei),武汉大学经济与管理学院教授,数理经济与数理金融系主任,珞珈青年学者、珞珈领秀人才特聘教授。兼任广东省公共资源交易咨询委员会特聘专家。研究领域为行为与实验经济学、 应用计量经济学。论文发表于 Marketing Science、Econometric Theory、 Journal of Regional Science,Economic Modeling、 Pacific Economic Review 等国际SSCI 学术期刊,以及《经济学(季 刊)》、《中国工业经济》、《系统工程理论与实践》等中文权威学术期刊。主持国家自然科学基金、教育部人文社会科学项目等多个科研项目。




Learning Python (作为入门可以只看前15章)
Web Scraping with Python(作为入门可以只看前7章)
Python for Data Analysis


英文好的同学可以参照 coursera 的 Programming for Everybody (Getting Started with Python)学习。